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Purpose 
Corporations and large entities are increasingly disclosing material information on their financial and 
non-financial capitals in integrated reports (IR). The rationale behind their IR is to improve their 
legitimacy with institutions and stakeholders, as they are expected to communicate on all aspects of 
their value-creating activities, business models and strategic priorities. In this light, this contribution 
traces the theoretical underpinnings that have led to the organizations’ environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) disclosures, and to explain the purpose of integrated thinking and reporting.  
 
Design / Methodology 
Following a review of relevant theories in business and society literature, this contribution examines 
the latest developments in corporate communication. This research explores the GRI’s latest 
Sustainability Reporting Standards as it sheds light on IIRC’s <IR> framework. Afterwards, it 
investigates the costs and benefits of using IR as a vehicle for the corporate disclosures on financial 
and non-financial performance. 
 
Findings: 
This contribution sheds light on the latest developments that have led to the emergence of the 
organizations’ integrated thinking and reporting as they include financial and non-financial capitals in 
their annual disclosures. The findings suggest that the investors and the other financial stakeholders 
remain the key stakeholders of many organizations; it explains that they still represent the 
primary recipients of the corporate reports. However, the integrated disclosures are also helping 
practitioners to improve their organizational stewardship and to reinforce their legitimacy with 
institutions and other stakeholders in society, as they embed ESG information in their IR.  
 
Research Limitations / Implications: 
This paper has discussed about the inherent limitations of the accounting, reporting and auditing 
of the organizations’ integrated disclosures. It pointed out that the practitioners may risk focusing 
their attention on the form of their reports, rather than on the content of their integrated reports. 
Moreover, this contribution implies that the report preparers (and their stakeholders) would benefit if 
their IR is scrutinized and assured by independent, externally-recognized audit firms.  
 
Originality / Value:  
This contribution has addressed a gap in academic literature along two lines of investigation. Firstly, it 
linked key theoretical underpinnings on the agency, stewardship, institutional and legitimacy theories, 
with the latest developments in corporate communication. Secondly, it critically evaluated the 
regulatory instruments, including; GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Standards and the <IR>’s 
framework, among others; as these institutions are supporting organizations in their integrated 
thinking and reporting. 
 
Keywords: Integrated Reporting, Non-Financial Reporting, Corporate Reporting, Legitimacy Theory, 
Institutional Theory, Stewardship Theory. 
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Introduction 
Several public-interest entities, including listed businesses are already disclosing non-
financial information in their corporate reports (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2016; Adams, 2015; 
Lueg, Lueg, Andersen and Dancianu 2016). They may be driven by an increased awareness 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues (Elving, Golob, Podnar, Ellerup-Nielsen and 
Thomson, 2015). Alternatively, they could be influenced by institutions and stakeholder 
expectations about the role of business in society (Golob, Podnar, Elving, Ellerup Nielsen, 
Thomsen and Schultz, 2013; Brammer, Jackson and Matten, 2012). The report preparers are 
often combining financial as well as material information on their environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) performance in their integrated reporting (IR). Their corporate 
communications are stimulating ‘integrated thinking’ (Knauer and Serafeim, 2014) as report 
preparers gather information on their organizations’ governance, performance and prospects 
from strategic and operational departments (Flower, 2015; de Villiers, Rinaldi and Unerman, 
2014). Therefore, they may employ other institutions’ regulatory tools and instruments, 
including standards or frameworks to support them in their internal planning and control 
purposes (Lueg et al., 2016). The internationally recognized standards, approaches and 
principles gave led to significant improvements in the organizations’ dialogue with a 
growing variety of stakeholders (Lai, Melloni and Stacchezzini, 2018; Camilleri, 2015, 
Eccles and Krzus, 2010), and are helping them to increase their accountability for the broad 
bases of financial and non-financial capitals (Lueg et al., 2016; IIRC, 2013).  
There is a wide plethora of possible disclosure formats that may be used for the corporations’ 
ESG disclosures, including the UN Global Compact, OECD guidelines for multinational 
enterprises, ISO 26000, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and the International Integrated 
Reporting Council (IIRC), among others. These regulatory instruments are intended to 
address the shortcomings in corporate communications (Dumay, Bernardi, Guthrie and 
Demartini, 2016; IIRC, 2013), as former stand-alone, financial or social responsibility reports 
have failed to account for the interconnections between financial and ESG performance 
(Eccles and Krzus, 2010). Notwithstanding, international and local institutional frameworks 
can(not) facilitate the organizations’ sustainability reporting (Stacchezzini, Melloni and Lai, 
2016; Golob, et al., 2013; Jensen and Berg, 2011). As a result, entities may decide to 
incorporate robust economic, environmental and social performance metrics in support of 
their overall vision for integrated thinking, as IR provides a holistic picture of their 
businesses’ vallue-creating activities (Maroun, 2018; Simnett and Huggins, 2015; Adams, 
2015, Milne and Gray, 2013). The report preparers communicate about their financial as well 
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as on their non-financial performance that is consistent with their corporate strategy. IR 
presumes that the businesses are willing to engage with different stakeholders, not just 
financial capital providers (Adams, 2015). Hence, it brings about the socialization of 
financial and ESG performance, as businesses respond to their stakeholders’ legitimate 
needs and interests (Lai et al., 2018; Higgins, Stubbs and Love, 2014, p. 1102; IIRC, 2013).  
Research Question 
This contribution addresses a research gap in academia along two lines of investigation. 
Firstly, it links key theoretical underpinnings from business ethics literature with the ongoing 
developments in corporate communication.  The stewardship, institutional and legitimacy 
theories have contributed to the advancement of the organizations’ responsible and 
sustainable behaviors that are often reflected in their integrated reporting (de Villiers et al., 
2014; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Brammer et al., 2012; Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989). Indeed, the legitimacy theory (Beck, 
Dumay and Frost, 2015; Deegan, 2002; Suchman, 1995) has often been used to interpret the 
content of corporate reporting, including CSR communications (Elving et al., 2015; Golob et 
al., 2013). Thus, this research adds value to the extant literature by exploring the emergence 
of non-financial reporting within a broader legitimation strategy. It suggests that the 
organizations’ integrated disclosures of material information appertaining to financial, 
manufactured, intellectual, human, social and natural capitals will help them forge 
relationships with stakeholders as they improve their legitimacy with institutions and other 
interested parties. Moreover, the institutional theory, and its related concepts of isomorphism 
(Dacin, 1997; Deephouse, 1996) and isopraxism (Adams, Potter, Singh and York, 2016) 
elucidates our interpretation on why corporate reporting approaches are (not) converging 
toward integrated reporting. Secondly, it critically analyzes specific aspects of GRI’s latest 
Sustainability Reporting Standards and sheds light on the IIRC’s <IR> framework. It also 
investigates the costs and benefits of using integrated reporting for the corporate disclosures 
on financial and non-financial performance. 
The rationale for this contribution is to further consolidate the ‘integrated thinking and 
reporting’ of the organizations’ capitals in clear, concise and comparable communications 
(Perego Kennedy and Whiteman, 2016; Knauer and Serafeim, 2014). This paper is a useful 
complement to the latest empirical studies that explore the causal relationships between the 
corporate disclosures of ESG performance and organizational legitimacy. In addition, it links 
key theoretical underpinnings on corporate sustainability and social responsibility literature to 
the contemporary practices in corporate communication.  
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Literature Review 
Relevant academic literature suggests that the practicing organizations’ underlying motive 
behind their non-financial disclosures is to maximize their financial capital and profit. This 
argumentation is synonymous with many conceptual theories in academic literature that seek 
to justify the rationale for voluntary, integrated reporting:  
The Agency Theory 
In the twentieth century, corporations were clearly distinguishing the difference between the 
ownership and control of wealth. The business owners were considered as principals as they 
employed executives (agents) to manage their firms. The executives acted as agents for the 
principals, and they were morally responsible to maximize their shareholders’ wealth (i.e. the 
principals’ wealth). The executives accepted their agents’ status because they perceived the 
opportunity to maximize their own utility. The agency theory suggested that the company 
executives and their principals are motivated by opportunities for their own personal gain 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Rightly so, the principals invest their wealth in profitable companies and 
will probably design governance systems in ways that will maximize their investments. On 
the other hand, agents accept the responsibility of managing their principals’ undertakings to 
secure their employment prospects. However, at times, there may be divergences between the 
managers and their principals. There may be situations where the agents may feel constrained 
by their principals’ imposed structures and controlling mechanisms (Davis et al., 1997). This 
matter may lead to unproductivity outcomes and could ultimately bring significant losses to 
the principals themselves. The crux of the agency theory is that the principals are expected to 
delegate authority to agents to act on their behalf. It is this delegated responsibility that at 
times allows agents to opportunistically build their own utility at the expense of their 
principals' utility. This happens when there are unaligned objectives; where managers may be 
motivated by their individualistic, self-serving goals, rather than by being good stewards for 
their principals (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The Stewardship Theory  
The stewardship theory is the collective-serving model of behavior that is driven by the 
organizations’ intrinsic values. In this case, the organization would do what is best for society 
and the planet (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The stewardship behaviors benefit principals 
through the positive effects of profits on corporate dividends and share prices. Consequently, 
the stewards place higher value on cooperation, rather than defection (these terms are also 
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found in the game theory), because they perceive greater utility in collaborative behaviors. 
Stewardship theorists assume that there is a strong relationship between successful 
organizations and their principals’ satisfaction. The stewards protect and maximize their 
shareholders’ wealth because by so doing, they maximize their utility functions toward 
principals.  
Stewards who successfully improve their organizational performance will also satisfy other 
stakeholder groups who will have their own vested interests. Therefore, pro-organizational 
stewards are motivated to maximize organizational performance, whilst satisfying the 
competing interests of shareholders. The utility that they gain from pro-organizational 
behaviors is higher than the utility that could be gained through individualistic, self-serving 
behaviors. This theory suggests that stewards believe that their interests are aligned with 
those of the corporation that engaged them (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). In practice, this 
theory’s ideals are evidenced in IIRC’s <IR> Framework as it emphasizes the stewardship of 
multiple capitals, including; financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, social and natural 
capital (IR, 2013).  In the past, the accountability of social and environmental capitals has 
often been found to be completely lacking in corporate disclosures (Adams et al., 2016; GRI, 
2017). The companies were not always presenting a true and fair view of their externalities, 
as they were reluctant to promote their responsible and sustainable behaviors (Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2017; Eccles and Krzus, 2010). This may be due to a lack of awareness on the 
business case for such activities (Camilleri, 2015). The organizations’ motivations for 
undertaking the stewardship behaviors, including the ESG initiatives seem to fall into two 
converging camps: doing good practices (this is consistent with the predictions of the 
stewardship theory) or doing well (this is consistent with the institutional and legitimacy 
theories). 
The Institutional Theory  
Organizations react to the institutional pressures by adopting rules and procedures (Suchman 
1995). Different components of the institutional theory explain how certain processes become 
established as authoritative guidelines for societal behaviors. Very often, structures and 
institutions are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and eventually 
they may also fall into decline and disuse. This theory acknowledges that individuals and 
organizations have the capacity to create, maintain, and change institutions through various 
mechanisms (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Unlike the efficiency-based theories which focus on 
profit maximization, or on the interactions between markets and governments; the 
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institutional theory considers a wider range of variables that could influence the decision-
making processes in organizations, including; their span of control, job programmability and 
compensation policy, among others (Eisenhardt, 1988). The situational variables arising from 
the immediate job context and the broader organizational culture could influence the 
organizations’ normative structures and reinforcement contingencies, including; the 
individual employees’ obedience to authority, and their pressures to accept responsibility for 
their behaviors.  
The institutional theory clarifies how firms respond to their surrounding environments where 
they operate. Stakeholders, including; governments, regulatory authorities, NGOs, and other 
organizations within the supply chain can exert their influence on businesses. Organizations 
must conform to the institutional norms and rules that are prevailing in their operating 
environment. As a result, their compliance with the formal regulations will earn them 
legitimacy among stakeholders (Beck et al., 2015; Hahn and Lülfs, 2014; Dacin, 1997; 
Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995). Further research is showing how the institutions effect 
organizational behaviors, particularly on CSR disclosure issues (Adams, 2015). Historically, 
the notion of CSR has emerged from the institutionalized forms of social solidarity that have 
emerged from liberal market economies. Therefore, the institutional theory offers promising 
ways of investigating what lies at the heart of the publics’ concern as the corporations are 
influenced by the institutions’ ethos, voluntary principles, policies and programs (Camilleri, 
2015). Their responsible behaviors have often been triggered by socio-political forces and 
pressure groups (Elving et al., 2015). In this case, CSR practice and its reporting rests on the 
dichotomy between the corporations’ voluntary engagement and their socially-binding 
responsibilities (Brammer et al., 2012). The fact that CSR disclosures remained a ‘voluntary’ 
practice in many contexts, is a clear reflection of the organizations’ institutional context (De 
Villiers, Venter and Hsiao, 2017; Stacchezzini, Melloni and Lai, 2016; Camilleri, 2015). 
Numerous institutions have played a dynamic role, both individually and collectively in the 
development of integrated reporting (Jensen and Berg, 2012; Jackson and Apostolakou, 
2010). While governments have been the primary force for the promotion of financial 
reporting standards through security exchange commissions; other institutions like the UN 
Global Compact, OECD, ISO, GRI and IIRC, among others, as they have facilitated the 
growth and diffusion of non-financial reporting mechanisms (Camilleri, 2015; Adams, 2015). 
Isomorphism and Isopraxisim 
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Isomorphism has been constructed in conjunction with the applications of the institutional 
theory (Dacin, 1997). This concept has been propagated through cultural and associational 
processes that arise when ideas or innovations travel, and are adopted in different contexts 
(Dacin, 1997; Deephouse, 1996). For example, in this day and age, a previously-isolated 
island society that makes contact with the rest of the globe, would quickly take on 
standardized forms of economic forces, power relationships, and cultures that are similar to 
other nation-states around the world. Similarly, the notion of isopraxism refers to ideas that 
are translated and modified by different actors to suit their own needs. Isomorphism and its 
related notion, isopraxism are potentially helpful to framing our interpretation of why 
integrated reporting approaches may converge (or not) over time.  
For example, the principles-based and non-mandatory <IR> Framework could potentially 
create explicit and implicit reporting norms that could encourage the organizations’ non-
financial disclosures through integrated reporting. Humphrey, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2016) 
argued that IIRC has claimed an institutional space which consists of competing, non-
integrated, sets of corporate reporting initiatives. They suggested that the <IR> framework 
offers something to ‘everyone’ as it may appeal to new, enlightened long-term investors. In 
this sense, isomorphism may be useful to understand how and why the disclosures of ESG 
content can become widely accepted across companies, over time (Adams et al., 2016; 
Deephouse, 1996). In a similar vein, isopraxism has been used to describe instances where 
identifiable institutional forces may lead to new and different actions within specific 
organizational and social instances. Therefore, isopraxism suggests that the legitimate 
organizations may be intrigued to move toward more integrated approaches to reporting.  
The Legitimacy Theory 
Organizations prepare integrated reports in an attempt to maintain and repair their legitimacy 
among stakeholders (De Villiers et al., 2017). Their sustainability accounting and disclosures 
will usually reflect the institutional environments’ values and expectations (Camilleri, 2015). 
As a result, responsible organizations become legitimate entities; particularly, if they comply 
with the relevant societal rules and norms (Beck et al., 2015; Deegan, 2002). The 
organizations’ stakeholders will probably appraise the legitimate organizations who uphold 
their social contract, when “their actions are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially-constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 
574). Therefore, the drivers of the institutional legitimacy may be influenced by the 
organizations’ external environment; according to the culturally-defined values and beliefs in 
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society. On the other hand, stakeholders will severely sanction irresponsible organizations 
when they do not respect the societal norms and ethical values. 
Suchman (1995) described the concept of legitimacy as an operational resource assuming a 
“high level of managerial control over legitimization processes” (p. 576). Similarly, Hedberg 
and Malmborg (2003) contended that legitimate companies increased their credibility of their 
CSR engagement among stakeholders. These authors used the GRI guidelines as a vehicle for 
their organizational legitimacy. Other researchers suggested that legitimacy is strategic as it 
emanates from recurring conflicts between management and stakeholders (Dacin, Oliver and 
Roy, 2007; Suchman 1995). Arguably, the organizational legitimacy can be achieved by 
forging strong relationships with stakeholders. For this reason, organizations ought to adapt 
their corporate disclosures according to their stakeholders’ expectations, to garner their trust 
and achieve legitimacy (Hahn and Lülfs, 2014). However, any changes in corporate reporting 
should be driven by the organizations’ internal decisions on materiality (Eccles and Krzus, 
2014). Hence, the managers’ agenda is to strategically enhance their organizational 
legitimacy by reporting material information on their financial and non-financial 
performance.  
The Corporations’ Non-Financial Disclosures 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Jenkins Report may be considered as 
one of the major documents that has provided the foundations for non-financial disclosures 
(Rivera-Arrubla, Zorio-Grima and García-Benau, 2017). Notwithstanding, there were other 
guidelines that were developed by other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including; 
the Global Reporting Initiative, AccountAbility, Accounting for Sustainability (A4S), the 
World Intellectual Capital Initiative (WICI), the Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium, 
the CDP (formerly known as the Carbon Disclosure Project), the International Corporate 
Governance Network, the Sustainability Reporting Standards Board and the Climate 
Disclosure Standards Board, among others. The International Standards Organization (ISO), 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Greenpeace, Rainforest Alliance and Home Depot 
Certifiable, Fair Trade and the US Department of Agriculture’s USDA Organic Labelling, 
among others, have formulated uncertifiable, multi-stakeholder standards and instruments 
(Castka and Corbett, 2016) to support organizations in their CSR communication. In addition, 
certain listed corporations are adopting Fortune’s reputation index, the KLD Social index or 
RepTrak (Camilleri, 2017). Such measures require corporate executives to assess the extent 
to which their organization behaves responsibly towards the environment and the community. 
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Despite the development of these guiding principles and indices, their appropriateness 
remains doubtful (Camilleri, 2017; Adams, 2015).  
 
In 2010, the development of ISO 26000 had represented a significant milestone in integrating 
socially and environmentally responsible behaviors into management processes (Toppinen, 
Virtanen, Mayer, and Tuppura, 2015; Hahn, 2013). ISO 26000 was developed through a 
participatory multi-stakeholder process as the International Labor Organization (ILO) had 
established a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to ensure that ISO’s social 
responsibility standard is consistent with its own labor standards. In fact, ISO 26000’s core 
subject on ‘Labor Practices’ is based on ILOs’ conventions on labor practices, including; 
Human Resources Development Convention, Occupational Health and Safety Guidelines, 
Forced Labor Convention, Freedom of Association, Minimum Wage Fixing 
Recommendation and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Recommendation, among others. 
Moreover, ISO’s core subject on ‘human rights’ is based on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (that was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948). On the other hand, 
many academic commentators argue that ISO 26000 has never been considered as a 
management standard (Camilleri, 2017). The certification requirements have not been 
incorporated into ISO 26000’s development and reinforcement process, unlike other 
standards, including ISO 9000 and ISO 14001 (Hahn, 2013). Notwithstanding, ISO 14001 
belongs to a larger set of ISO 14000 certifications that conform with the European Union's 
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) (Lueg et al, 2016). 
 
The European Union (EU) has developed its non-binding guidelines for the non-financial 
disclosures of large, public-interest entities that engage more than 500 employees (Stubbs 
and Higgins, 2015; EU, 2014). The European Parliament mandated Directive 2014/95/EU on 
non-financial reporting; that was subsequently ratified by the European member states. 
Therefore, large undertakings are expected to disclose material information on their ESG 
behaviors. These entities are required to explain any deviations from their directive’s 
recommendations in their annual declaration of conformity, as per the EU’s “Comply or 
Explain” principle (Camilleri, 2015; EU, 2014). Their non-financial disclosures include 
topics, such as; social dialogue with stakeholders, information and consultation rights, trade 
union rights, health and safety and gender equality, among other issues. Moreover, the 
organizations’ environmental reporting could cover; material disclosures on energy 
efficiencies, the monitoring of efficiency levels their energy generation capacities, 
assessments on the co-generation of heating facilities, the use of renewable energy, 
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greenhouse gas emissions, water and air pollution prevention and control from the 
production and processing of metals, mineral industry, chemical industry, waste 
management, livestock farming, etc. (EU, 2014). Therefore, large undertakings are expected 
to bear responsibility for the prevention and reduction of pollution. The EU recommends that 
the large organizations implement ILO’s Tri-partite Declaration of Principles on 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, as well as other conventions that promote the 
fair working conditions of employees. It also makes reference to the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, the 10 principles of the UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, and mentions ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on 
Social Responsibility (EU, 2014). Following, the EU’s mandate for non-financial reporting, 
it is expected that 6,000 European public interest entities will be publishing their 
sustainability reports in 2018, covering financial year 2017-2018 (GRI, 2017).  
Sustainability Reporting 
In the past two decades, many entities started to incorporate economic, environmental and 
social performance indicators that were reinforced and institutionalized through GRI’s 
sustainability reporting guidelines (Stacchezzini et al., 2016; Simnett and Huggins, 2015; 
Milne and Gray, 2013). The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was one of the earliest 
proponents of sustainability reporting (Hahn and Lülfs, 2014; Hedberg and Von Malmborg, 
2003). GRI was formed in 1997 by two United States-based non-governmental organizations, 
namely; Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (Ceres) and Tellus Institute, 
in collaboration with the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). In 2000, GRI 
released its Sustainability Reporting Guidelines during the World Summit for Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg. In 2013, GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines were 
promoted as the G4 guidelines. Eventually, the G4 Guidelines were superseded by the GRI 
Sustainability Reporting Standards (GRI Standards) on the 1st July 2018.  
GRI claims that its latest Standards represent global best practice for the public reporting 
on a range of economic, environmental and social impacts. The GRI report preparers are 
expected to provide material information about their organizations’ positive or negative 
contributions to sustainable development. Their sustainability report should include three 
Universal Standards, namely; GRI 101 (foundation), GRI 102 (general disclosures) and GRI 
103 (management approach).  
GRI 101 is the starting point for using GRI standards as it presents the Reporting Principles 
that define the content and quality of the disclosures. It explains the basic processes and the 
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fundamental requirements for the reporting of material topics. GRI 102 describes the 
contextual information on the organization’s profile, strategy, ethics (and integrity), 
governance, stakeholder engagement practices, and reporting process. This section provides 
the context for subsequent, more detailed reporting on the organizations’ economic, 
environmental and social impacts. GRI 103 provides narrative information of how 
organizations identify, analyze and respond for their economic, environmental and social 
impacts. Whilst GRI 200 (Economic), GRI 300 (Environmental) or GRI 400 (Social) 
Standards have been designed to enhance the global comparability and quality of information 
on the organizations’ impacts, thereby enabling greater transparency and accountability of 
practitioners (GRI, 2016). 
 
The sustainability disclosures have a lengthy tradition of voluntary reporting, unlike the 
corporations’ financial statements (Stubbs 2015). The proponents of the voluntary reporting 
argue that the businesses respond to their stakeholders’ requirements, by being accountable 
and transparent about their sustainability. While the businesses may willing to embed 
sustainable practices in their operations, many stakeholders may question the reliability of 
the voluntary sustainability reports. While it may appear that businesses may support the 
voluntary approaches, relevant research suggests that in some contexts they may support 
mandatory approaches (de Villiers and van Staden, 2011). Beck et al. (2017) reported that 
the organizations’ relationship with external guidelines has evolved from their compliance as 
a means of seeking external legitimation to the present pragmatic position, where their ESG 
disclosures are informed by the organization’s strategic positioning, and not constrained by 
the promulgation of voluntary guidelines.  
 
Very often, the practitioners’ sustainable performance is not independently verified or 
assured (Stubbs, 2015). GRI prescribed the threshold for the definition of the material topics 
whilst describing the context of the reporting organization. In a similar vein, AccountAbility 
recommends the materiality tests, as practitioners are expected to communicate on their 
transparent processes of stakeholder engagement. Organizations are subjected to external 
assurance mechanisms, that examine the process and the results (Maroun, 2018).  However, 
in practice, the report preparers are not always adopting all of the standard setters’ guidelines 
(Eccles and Krzus, 2014). This argumentation strengthens the case for the regulatory 
approaches to address the lack of enforcement mechanisms as enforceable rules can foster 
compliance and credible report assurance practices (Maroun, 2018). The regulations will 
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only provide the minimum norms with which corporations have to comply (Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2014). Lately, the sustainability reporting is evolving to include more 
interdependencies with the financial information (Camilleri, 2017) as environmental, social 
and governance issues are embedded into the organizational strategy (Jensen and Berg, 
2012). 
 
 
Integrated Reporting 
An increasing number of academics, governments, audit firms, interest groups and businesses 
are advocating the publication of integrated disclosures that link financial and ESG 
performance in one report (de Villiers and Maroun, 2017; Beck et al., 2017; Adams, 2015; 
Eccles and Krzus, 2010). The organizations’ ethical behaviors are often equated with their 
obligation to disclose a true and fair view of their financial and non-financial performance 
(Maniora, 2015; Simnett and Huggins, 2015; Adams, 2015; EU, 2014). 
In the aftermath of the global economic and financial crisis of 2007–2008, many policy 
makers, regulatory authorities and leading financial institutions were willing to improve the 
content of their corporate reporting. At the same time, there was an increased awareness on 
how the communication of ESG issues could help them enhance their corporate reputation 
and image (Camilleri, 2015). As a result, in 2010, the Prince of Wales’ Accounting for 
Sustainability Project together with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) established the International Integrated 
Reporting Committee (IIRC). Subsequently, it changed its name to International Integrated 
Reporting Council. The IIRC’s <IR> framework has somewhat addressed the perennial 
criticisms and shortcomings of sustainability reporting, as it considered all of the 
organizational capitals (Stacchezzini et al., 2016; Jensen and Berg, 2012). Other major 
changes brought about by IIRC was an increased emphasis on materiality (Montecalvo, 
Farneti and de Villiers, 2018).  
An Appraisal on Integrated Reporting 
IIRC’s <IR> framework has aligned financial and non-financial capital allocations with 
specific corporate behaviors (Fasan and Mio, 2017; Camilleri, 2017). It has categorized 
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different stocks of value, including; Financial Capital; Manufactured Capital; Intellectual 
Capital; Human Capital; Social (and Relationship) Capital; as well as Natural Capital (IR, 
2013). IIRC explains how industry and firm-level characteristics (including; board size and 
diversity) can play a significant role in the determination of material, non-financial 
disclosures. Therefore, the concept of materiality is fundamental to its audit and assurance 
(Eccles, and Krzus, 2014). García-Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez (2017) suggested that IIRC’s 
<IR> tool can help to mitigate agency problems and can also improve the quality of material 
information for investors. IR facilitates corporate decision-making as it breaks down 
operational and reporting silos, resulting in improved systems and processes (Stubbs and 
Higgins, 2015).  
The <IR> framework’s strategic focus calls for both internalization and externalization 
processes. Internalization is a process through which the organization’s human resources 
adopt the framework’s external ideas, opinions, views or concepts, as their own. This process 
starts with learning about the reporting framework. Afterwards, the report preparers will be in 
a position to  understand how its implementation makes sense to their organization, as a 
whole. The internal stakeholders will probably experience a process of adaptation until they 
finally accept that their organization’s integrated reporting of financial and non-financial 
capitals creates value for them, over time. Thus, the internalization process can be understood 
as a process of acceptance of a new set of norms and working practices that could ultimately 
improve the organization’s holistic performance in the long term. The organizations’ internal 
transformation may lead to significant changes in ‘integrated thinking’, as they embed ESG 
performance with their strategic and operational processes.  
The organizations’ non-financial disclosures will shed light on the externalities that affect 
their stakeholders, the environment and other unrelated parties. In other words, through 
integrated reporting; the internal effects of integrated reporting are finally externalized 
outside the organizations’ boundaries. At times, organizations may intentionally or 
unintentionally conceal ESG information from their corporate reporting. Such unethical 
practices may result from conscious or unconscious organizational behaviors, or from 
corporate misconduct when dealing with extensive information outputs. Hence, IIRC’s <IR> 
framework encourages organizations to report both positive and negative behaviors that 
substantively affect their ability to create value over the short, medium and long term. 
Practitioners are also expected to provide adequate and sufficient contextual information 
about their capitals in their corporation communication. Nevertheless, despite the increased 
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proliferation of integrated disclosures, only a few scholars have taken an optimistic stance 
on IR (Lai et al., 2018; Maroun, 2018; Flower, 2015; Stubbs and Higgins, 2014). 
A Critique on Integrated Reporting 
A few commentators argued that IIRC’s framework focuses on the information demands 
of capital providers, and did not address the decision-making and accountability needs of 
other stakeholders (Brown and Dillard, 2014). Rensburg and Botha (2014) suggested that 
the integrated reports should be simplified and made comprehensible to a wider stakeholder 
audience. They maintained that this report should be easily understood by the general public. 
Stubbs and Higgins (2014) argued that IR focuses on the ‘supply side’, namely, the preparers 
of the corporate statements, whilst leaving out the ‘demand side’, i.e. the market stakeholders. 
These authors held that there was a significant gap between the information that was supplied 
by the reporting companies and the information that was sought by the financial markets. De 
Villiers et al. (2014) contended that the close connections between the report preparers 
and the investors can limit its potential to help other stakeholders to better understand 
the non-financial impacts of their organization.  
Other researchers maintained that the IIRC’s framework comprised ambiguous meanings and 
assessments of non-financial capitals, that have inevitably led to complexities in the 
assurance mechanisms of integrated reports (Maroun, 2018; Cheng, Green, Conradie, Konishi 
and Romi, 2014). Notwithstanding, the integrated disclosures are not scrutinized by 
externally-recognized assurance mechanisms. Rivera-Arrubla et al. (2016) reported that the 
level of the corporate disclosures is significantly associated with the specific contextual 
environment (i.e. region and industry) of the practitioners. Therefore, the report preparers 
ought to identify the recipients (i.e. the users) of their integrated reports (Adams et al., 2016). 
Pistoni, Songini and Bavagnoli (2018) noticed that the IR reports were not disclosing 
appropriate information on their business model, strategic priorities, and on their companies’ 
value creation processes; as more attention was devoted to the form of the IR disclosures, 
rather than on their content. Flower (2015) posited that investors and societal stakeholders 
have different needs and expectations. A number of criticisms have been levelled at IR, 
particularly on its emphasis to satisfy the financial capital providers, to the detriment of 
other key stakeholders (Cheng et al., 2014).  
Businesses tend to focus on creating value through profit maximization for their capital 
providers (Rowbottom and Locke, 2016; Flower, 2015; Adams, 2015; Van Bommel, 2014; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, IR offers a limited approach to ensure the corporate 
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accountability toward stakeholders (Brown and Dillard, 2014; Flower, 2015). Whilst, 
investors and creditors require financial information regarding their future profitability, 
external stakeholders expect broad-based information, irrespective of corporate interest. 
These stakeholders, including the organizations’ customers (and prospects), suppliers, 
regulatory authorities, and the community at large, hold different views on what capital 
should be emphasized (Van Bommel, 2014). Flower (2015) argued that report preparers had 
no obligation to disclose their externalities (on the environment), where there is no 
subsequent impact on their firm. Similarly, Perego et al. (2016) hinted that the report 
preparers made different value judgments when anchoring the effects of their ESG 
information. It is very unlikely that they trade-off different forms of financial and non-
financial capital, in line with the requirements of IIRC’s framework (de Villiers et al., 
2017).  
By adopting key financial reporting conventions, and linking materiality to value 
creation, IR might not extend the accountability of the organizations’ capitals (Deegan, 
2013). Moreover, Brown and Dillard (2014) claimed that IR actually centers more on 
stakeholder management rather than on stakeholder accountability. Such argumentation 
suggests that academia is not convinced that IR has successfully improved the corporate 
accountability on financial and non-financial performance. Perhaps, the accountancy 
profession should exercise its authority over the institutional processes in order to bring a 
fundamental shift in framing the accountability, reporting and assurance of the 
organizations’ ESG performance (Lai et al., 2018; Beck et al., 2017).  
 
Conclusions and Future Research Avenues 
The practice of sustainability and integrated reporting has evolved because of the 
stakeholders’ needs for corporate communication. Relevant academic literature has yielded 
many recommendations, ideas and concepts that have surely improved the quality of 
corporate reporting. A critical review of different regulatory tools and voluntary instruments 
for the organizations’ financial and non-financial disclosures suggests that the practice of 
integrated reporting represents a new strand for the communication of corporate responsible 
and sustainable behaviors. Therefore, this research adds value to academic knowledge by 
linking key conceptual developments from the business ethics literature with the 
contemporary developments in corporate communication. This contribution explains that the 
agency, stewardship, institutional and legitimacy theories have anticipated the development 
of the sustainability standards and led to the organizations’ integrated reporting of financial 
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and non-financial capitals. The author has presented an appraisal and a critique of GRI’s 
latest Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and of IIRC’s <IR> framework, and its content 
elements. Businesses and other entities can use IR to communicate about the strategic 
positioning of their financial and non-financial capitals to stakeholders.  The investors and 
the other financial stakeholders remain the key stakeholders of many organizations, and 
they continue to represent the primary recipients of the corporate reports. However, other 
stakeholders are also putting pressure on corporations and public interest entities to disclose 
more information on social issues and on matters relating to governance, environmental 
sustainability in their annual statements. This is in line with the aim of IR, as both financial 
and non-financial stakeholders have basic, convergent expectations about the companies’ 
strategies (IIRC, 2013). Therefore, the integrated disclosures of material information 
appertaining to financial and non-financial performance will help them forge important 
relationships with different stakeholders, as they improve their stewardship and legitimacy 
with institutions and other interested parties. 
The findings of this paper suggest that IR has provided a passive avenue for the 
legitimization of corporations and large entities (Maroun, 2018; de Villiers et al., 2017; 
Adams et al., 2015; Beck et al., 2015; Dacin et al., 2007; Brown and Deegan, 1998) among 
stakeholders, as responsible organizations can disclose material information on their 
financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, social and natural capitals. Despite the critiques 
and the inherent limitations of IR that were duly covered in this paper, the researcher believes 
that in future organizations should be encouraged to disclose a true and fair view of their 
holistic activities, by including material aspects on their non-financial performance. This 
implies that the report preparers may require a dynamic process of adaptation, learning and 
action, as they have to redesign, implement and control their strategic and operational 
procedures that lead to “integrated thinking”. Hence, they will be in a position to incorporate 
financial and non-financial capitals in their IR disclosures. 
In conclusion, this contribution implies that there is scope for organizations to consolidate 
their ‘integrated thinking and reporting’ in clear, concise and comparable communications. It 
suggests that the integrated disclosures of the organizations’ capitals and their value-creating 
activities could catalyze positive behavioral changes in society and the environment. 
Therefore, future research could investigate the difficulties in the corporate accounting of 
non-financial capitals, as well as the audit and assurance of their integrated reports. To date, 
there is still scant empirical evidence on how IR can be used for the corporate communication 
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of the businesses’ holistic activities, and little is known about the effectiveness of IR for 
organizational stewardship and legitimacy. 
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